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COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
 
DAVID COLLINS* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Clauses in contracts which specify that all disputes will be decided by arbitration have 
become common both in transactions between commercial parties, and also in 
contracts with consumers.  This article will examine the way in which a compulsory 
arbitration clause will be regarded by a UK court in the consumer contract context.  It 
will attempt to argue that a protectionist mentality may be misplaced because 
disadvantages associated with consumer arbitration, primarily related to cost, may be 
illusory and are often outweighed by benefits. The first part of the discussion will 
focus on domestic contracts and will examine the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999, which prohibit ‘unfair’ clauses in consumer contracts.  
This will led to an evaluation of the public funding and cost controls that are available 
for consumers who use arbitration.  The second part of this article will explore 
international consumer arbitration from the perspective of the UK courts and touch 
upon some of the specific concerns raised by this process, including enforcement of 
arbitration awards under the New York Convention. The article will conclude with a 
brief discussion of recent law and economics literature which has identified hidden 
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functions served by standard form contracts containing such terms as arbitration 
clauses, which can benefit both consumers and suppliers.1 
 
WHEN CONSUMER ARBITRATION ISSUES WILL ARISE 
Clauses which require that all disputes will be submitted to arbitration may be found 
in standard form contracts which are seldom read by consumers, or if read at all, 
probably misunderstood.2  Even if the terms are read and comprehended before the 
contract is concluded, few consumers have adequate bargaining power to negotiate 
changes to them.  Standard form consumer contracts, or boilerplate contracts as they 
are referred to in American scholarship,3 have accordingly been viewed with derision 
by courts.4  They are typically viewed as a tool by which a stronger party exploits 
informational and resource imbalances to impose terms which are favourable to itself 
upon the weaker party, normally the consumer. Businesses, who as repeat players 
may determine the forum, the applicable law, and even the third party, can 
consequently gain control of the arbitration process to the disadvantage of ‘one-shot’ 
consumers.5 Oppression resulting from a clause in a standard form contract which 
mandates arbitration for the resolution of all future contractual disputes is linked to 
the potential for high costs of this procedure relative to litigation. This is especially so 
                                               
1
 The approach taken towards consumer arbitration clauses by other nations or courts in the European 
Union or elsewhere in the world will not be considered. For an excellent overview of these topics see 
Susan Schiavetta, ‘Does The Internet Occasion New Directions In Consumer Arbitration in the EU’ 
Journal of Information Law and Technology 2004 (3) 
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2004_3/schiavetta/> (last accessed November 2006) 
2
 Sometimes known as ‘Scott v Avery clauses’: see Scott v Avery (1855) 5 HLC 811. 
3
 Ewan McKendrick has drawn a distinction between the terms ‘boilerplate’ and ‘standard form 
contracts’, claiming that the former are arrived upon by negotiation between the parties and are 
common to most commercial contracts, whereas the latter are supplied exclusively by one party and are 
unique to their contracts:  Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2 ed (OUP, Oxford, 2005) at 427. 
However, the terms will be used interchangeably in this article for the purpose of simplicity. 
4
 See e.g. Schroeder Music Publishing Co v Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308 (per Lord Diplock at 1316); 
Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 
361 (per Lord Reid at 406). 
5
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Do the “Haves” come out ahead in Alternative Justice Systems: Repeat 
Players in ADR’ 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 19 (1999-2000). 
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in the United States, where it is believed that arbitration is frequently abused by 
traders who compel consumers into dispute settlement proceedings which are 
prohibitively expensive.6  Many European states have taken a severely restrictive 
approach towards pre-dispute arbitral clauses in consumer contracts for similar 
reasons.7  Compulsory arbitration clauses do not actually oust the jurisdiction of the 
court but rather provide that the court does not have jurisdiction until the arbitration 
award has been rendered.8  Still, this does prohibit initial recourse certain legal 
remedies and a claim brought first in the courts in violation of an arbitration clause 
could result in a stay or even an action in damages for breach of the agreement to 
arbitrate.  Refusal of access to the courts may accordingly be viewed as a denial of the 
right to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, although courts have noted that individuals are free to waive this right via an 
arbitration clause, as long as the waiver is voluntary and informed,9 conditions which 
lie at the root of judicial scrutiny of such clauses. 
Concerns regarding the unfairness that may result to consumers via 
compulsory arbitration must be tempered by the narrow scope of situations in which 
the validity of such clauses will ever incur judicial analysis.  First, the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations define ‘consumer’ as ‘any natural person who is 
acting for purposes outside his trade, business or profession.’10  This is a fairly 
restrictive definition which contemplates only transactions for goods and services 
intended for final, personal consumption by the individual who buys them. Second, 
                                               
6
 F.C. Miller, ‘Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building Barriers to Consumer Protection’ 
(1999) 78 Michigan Business Journal 302. 
7
 See generally Schiavetta note 1. 
8
 J Beatson, Anson’s Law of Contract, 28th ed (OUP, Oxford, 2002) at 364.  At common law any 
agreement which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the courts is contrary to public policy and void: 
Czarnikow v Roth Schmidt [1922] 2 K.B. 478. 
9
 Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2006] EWHC 479 (Ch) at [44] 
10
 Reg 3(1).  A full discussion of the concept of a consumer is beyond the scope of this article. 
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the Arbitration Act 1996 prohibits the upholding arbitration clauses for disputes worth 
less than £5000.11  This will exclude most day-to-day consumer transactions, 
including most of those conducted via standard form contracts.  Accordingly it seems 
that only mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts for the purchase of goods such as 
automobiles or luxury items would ever reach the stage where their validity could be 
asserted by a supplier.  However a wide range of service contracts of this quantum 
may specify arbitration as the mechanism for dispute resolution, especially in the 
building and removal industries.12 Therefore, in practical terms, although a relatively 
narrow band of disputes may be encompassed, compulsory consumer arbitration 
clauses before the courts remain an important issue.  
Disputes regarding the enforceability of a consumer arbitration clause will 
arise in one of four cases.13 First the consumer may refuse to honour the arbitration 
clause by not participating in the arbitral hearing.  This could result in a judicial action 
to compel arbitration. In the absence of that party, the arbitral tribunal might 
pronounce a default award. The validity of the arbitration clause may then be raised 
by the losing party in either a defence to judicial enforcement of the award brought by 
the winning party, or in a judicial action to annul the award. Secondly, the consumer 
might commence litigation in a national court, violating the arbitration agreement. 
This could be done concurrently with the supplier’s effort to initiate arbitration and 
could be combined with the supplier’s motion to stay judicial proceedings – during 
which proceeding the court will still inquire into the validity of the arbitration clause. 
                                               
11
 s. 91 and Unfair Arbitrations Agreement (Specified Amount) Order 1999, s.1 1999/2167.  This is the 
same as the current Small Claims Court limit.   
12
 Geraint Howells, ‘Consumer Arbitrations Agreement Act, 1988’ 10(1) Company Lawyer 1989 at 20. 
Builders and contractors who hire them have also not been seen to fit the seller and consumer model: 
Byren & Langley v Boston [2004] EWHC (QB) at [28].  Another typical consumer contract that might 
lawfully invoke arbitration is a packaged holiday. 
13
 As noted by Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration:  Commentary and Materials (Kluwer 
Law International, London, 2001) at 75. 
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A third situation could involve both parties participating in the arbitral process. The 
consumer might then assert that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction because of an 
invalid arbitral clause. The arbitral tribunal will consider an interim challenge to its 
own jurisdiction. The losing party could seek to have the jurisdictional award 
annulled in court, which will again involve the consideration of the validity of the 
arbitration clause. Finally, the parties could arbitrate on the merits of their disputes, 
with one party attempting to reserve its rights as to jurisdiction, or failing to argue 
lack of jurisdiction14. The losing party might then attempt to have the award annulled 
in national courts. The loser may refuse to honour the award which will lead to the 
winning party seeking judicial enforcement. Subject to claims that jurisdictional 
objections have been waived, the proceedings to annul or enforce the final award 
might raise the issue of the validity of the arbitral clause. It is also possible, as noted 
above, that the supplier might bring an action for damages in the courts for the 
consumer’s failure to honour an arbitration clause by initially suing in the courts. This 
article will not consider each of these situations individually, but rather will look at 
the process by which arbitration clauses will be evaluated once a court has been called 
upon to do so. Before engaging in this analysis, it will be suggested that arbitration 
can actually offer practical advantages to consumers.  
  
II. DOMESTIC CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
A. Advantages and Disadvantages 
The advantages to resolving contractual disputes via arbitration rather than litigation 
in courts are numerous and have been summarized effectively by McKendrick.15 
                                               
14
 The ECJ recently ruled that a national court seized of an action for annulment must consider the 
validity of the arbitration clause even though its invalidity was not pleaded in the arbitration proceeding 
itself: Mostaza Claro v Centro Movil Milenium, Case C – 168/05, 26 October 2006. 
15
 See e.g. Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law note 3 at 437-439.   
 6 
Briefly, because it does not take place in public court, arbitration is confidential and 
this can be desirable for parties who wish to avoid the stress or financial repercussions 
on the negative publicity engendered by court proceedings. The privacy of arbitral 
hearings is normally viewed as preferable for business parties but not for consumers 
who may wish to harness publicity to pressure settlement.  But confidentiality may 
also be attractive to a wealthy consumer or public figure16 who fears that the publicity 
of litigation could damage his or her reputation.  Indeed public litigation could 
compromise the privacy of all varieties of consumers.  Secondly, the flexibility of the 
arbitration process, which is less formal than that of ordinary courts, can be attractive 
to both parties, but particularly so to less sophisticated consumers, who might be 
intimidated by judges or lawyers. Depending on the language used in the clause, 
parties can choose when and where to arbitrate as well as the identities of the 
arbitrators and to an extent what form the arbitration will take. This helps to ensure 
the neutrality of the arbitral process, which, as we shall see below, is particularly 
important in international disputes.  Most importantly, consumers may not wish to (or 
be able to) incur the high legal costs associated with the myriad of processes endemic 
to civil litigation. Arbitration is believed to be, in some circumstances, quicker and 
cheaper than litigation in the courts.17  
There can be inherent disadvantages in the arbitration of consumer disputes. 
Arbitration can be expensive and is not always fast, but increased time and cost will 
often depend upon the degree of subsequent involvement by the courts.  Court 
intervention, in the appeal of an award for example, could raise costs beyond those 
which would have occurred had the dispute been heard by a court initially.  Appeals 
are permitted by the Arbitration Act 1996 on points of law arising out of an 
                                               
16
 Recall that the good or service to which the dispute relates will have cost more than £5000, see above 
note 11. 
17
 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law, note 3 at 437-439. 
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arbitrator’s award.18 The parties may agree to exclude the possibility of appeal, but in 
domestic arbitration such an agreement will only be upheld if it is entered into during 
arbitration proceedings, not beforehand.19  This rule operates as a safeguard to parties’ 
rights and should comfort consumers in domestic arbitration.  Apart from the cost of 
appeals, while arbitration itself can be cheaper, it is not always so. The potential for 
high costs associated with arbitrator’s fees and the hiring of premises20 could lead to 
the conclusion that arbitration is unduly onerous upon consumers. Consequently, 
clauses in consumer contracts which specify that all contractual disputes must be 
referred to arbitration will incur the scrutiny of courts and, according to the 
Arbitration Act21, this will now be performed via a specific piece of legislation, the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations. 
 
B. Arbitration Clauses and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations  
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 199922 (‘UTCCR’) came into 
force on 1 October 1999 and implement an EC Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts.23 The Directive was implemented by means of Regulations 
made under s.2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972.  No effort has been made 
by the UK Parliament to integrate the UTCCR with existing legislation on unfair 
contractual terms, specifically the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, and the 
interaction of the two instruments has been viewed with dismay by some.24 There 
appears to be no immediate plan to reform the law in this area, despite 
                                               
18
 s. 69(1). Unless both parties agree to the appeal then leave of the court is required, s. 69(2)-(3). 
19
 Arbitration Act 1996 ss.69 and 87(1) 
20
 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 4th ed 
(Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) at 14. 
21
 s. 89 
22
 SI 1999/2083 
23
 93/13 EEC 
24
 See e.g. Elizabeth Macdonald, ‘Unifying Unfair Terms Legislation’ (2004) 67(1) MLR 69 and Jesse 
Elvin, ‘The Application of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999’ 14(1) KCLJ 39  
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recommendations by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission to 
harmonize the existing legislation.25 The UTCCR apply to contracts between 
consumers26 and suppliers, a ‘supplier’ being ‘any natural or legal person who…is 
acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly or 
privately owned.’27The key feature of the UTCCR is its application of a ‘fairness’ test 
to non-individually negotiated terms in contracts between private buyers and 
businesses, the purpose of which is to protect consumers, as opposed to businesses.28 
As noted above, this protection is based upon the premise that such terms are either 
not read or not understood and consequently do not actively inform the consumer’s 
decision to contract.  This represents a dramatic departure from the doctrine of 
freedom of contract and supplements common law principles such as 
unconscionability and duress.  The UTCCR can be invoked by individual consumers 
in actions against a particular seller, but it also grants powers to the Director General 
of the Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’) to apply to court for injunctions to prevent the 
continued inclusion of unfair terms in general usage. These enforcement powers have 
been extended to numerous other ‘qualifying bodies’, including several utility 
regulators, the Financial Services Authority and the Consumer’s Association. The 
OFT remains the only body that is obliged to hear complaints regarding the 
implementation of the UTCCR. The OFT has stated that an exclusive arbitration 
agreement in a consumer contract might amount to an unfair term.29 This caution has 
                                               
25
 Letter from the Minister For Trade Investment and Foreign Affairs to the Chairman of the Law 
Commission, 24 July 2006 <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file34128.PDF> (last accessed Dec 2006).  
The reforms were suggested in The Law Commission Report no 292 and the Scottish Law Commission 
Report no 199. 
26
 See definition above note 10. 
27
 UTCCR Reg 3(1). 
28
 ‘Non-individually negotiated’ will include any terms that have been drafted in advance and the 
consumer was therefore not able to influence the substance of the term: s. 5(2).  If the supplier claims 
that the term must be individually negotiated, it bears the burden of proving so: s. 5(4). 
29
 Referring expressly to Paragraph 1(q) of Schedule 2 of the UTCCR (see below), the OFT advises 
that ‘Terms are liable to challenge if they tend to prevent consumers taking disputes to court, or require 
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is reflected in MacLeod’s sweeping statement that ‘a consumer arbitration agreement 
has generally been unenforceable, even with the consumer’s consent.’30  The OFT is 
empowered to approve Codes of Practice involving low-cost consumer arbitration 
schemes, although these envision arbitration as chosen by the parties after the dispute 
has arisen.31    
 Regulation 5(1) of the UTCCR provides that a term will be regarded as unfair 
if, ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer.’  The concept of ‘significant imbalance’ is unclear and has attracted a good 
deal of commentary.  McKendrick holds that it involves a consideration of the content 
of the term rather than the procedure which led to the conclusion of the contract.32 
Macdonald believes that the ‘significant imbalance’ test contemplates more than a 
simple ‘weighing of the parties rights and obligations as a whole’ but also must 
involve an assessment of any ‘unfair surprise’ resulting from an arbitration clause.33 
This view echoes that of Beale, who adds that imbalance will involve a 
disproportionate allocation of risk between the parties.34 In the leading case on the 
application of the UTCCR, Director General of Fair Trading v First National 
Bank,35which examined the continuance of a contractual interest rate after default 
judgment, Lord Bingham elaborated that there will be significant imbalance if ‘a term 
is so weighted in favour of the supplier as to tilt the parties’ rights and obligations 
under the contract significantly in his favour’, and this can either be a benefit to 
                                                                                                                                       
them to go to remote or inappropriate courts.’ OFT, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, February 2001, 
at 15   
30
 John MacLeod, Consumer Sales Law (Cavendish, London, 2002) at 98. 
31
 See Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, Aldershot, 2005) at 631-632. 
32
 McKendrick, Contract Law note 3 at 507. 
33
 Elizabeth Macdonald, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ 121 L.Q.R. 38 at 40. 
34
 Hugh Beale, ‘Unfair Contracts in Britain and Europe’ [1989] 42 C.L.P. 197 at 202. 
35
 [2001] UKHL 52; [2002] 1 AC 481 (HL) [hereinafter First National Bank]  
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supplier or the ‘imposing on the consumer of a disadvantageous burden’.36 Thus, with 
respect to a compulsory arbitration clause, the imbalance would evidently be the 
exploitation of unequal resources through an unnecessarily expensive procedure.  
Other potential advantages to the supplier and corresponding burdens to the consumer 
could be familiarity with a particular tribunal’s procedure or knowledge of the panel 
of arbitrators from which particular arbitrator’s could be chosen – the upper hand 
supposedly available to repeat players at the expense of ‘one-shotters’.37 This second 
set of concerns, which would be equally applicable to repeat litigators, effectively 
amounts to the same problem: burdensome expense resulting from the retaining of the 
proper legal counsel.  
The requirement of good faith from 5(1) is similarly nebulous, in particular 
because English contract law does not recognize a doctrine of good faith, a difficulty 
recognized by the House of Lords in First National Bank.  The appearance of this 
concept in the UTCCR, which is indicative of the European origin of the legislation, 
has been criticized because it is antithetical to the technical, rule-oriented style of 
legal reasoning that is common to the English courts.38In attempt to resolve the 
ambiguity, Lord Bingham described good faith as ‘fair and open dealing.’39 Lord 
Steyn felt that ‘good faith’ largely overlapped with ‘significant imbalance’ as they 
both encompass substantive, rather than procedural, fairness.40 The Regulation itself 
may provide better clarity.  In assessing the unfairness of a term, consideration must 
be given to: the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded 
                                               
36
 Ibid at [17].  ‘Disadvantageous burden’ seems to be a redundant expression. 
37
 Schiavetta note 1. 
38
 See generally Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants:  Good Faith in British Law’ (1998) 61(1) MLR 11 
at 19. 
39
 At [17]. 
40
 At [37]. 
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as well as the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract.41 Inquiring into 
the extent to which the offending term was brought to the attention of the party echoes 
the common law’s ‘Red Hand’ rule.42 A term that is held to be unfair shall not be 
binding on the consumer. However, the contract will continue to bind the parties if the 
offending term can be severed without impairing the functioning of the rest of the 
contract.43 Thus if an arbitration clause is held to be unfair, then the rest of the 
contract will remain in operation and disputes will be settled by conventional 
litigation. 
 The UTCCR is silent with respect to the burden of proof for unfairness. 
However, Schedule 2 to the UTCCA provides an Indicative and Non-Exhaustive List 
of Terms Which May be Regarded as Unfair, raising the likelihood that if one of the 
mentioned terms exists, it is up to the party asserting the term to prove that it is not 
unfair.  Item  I (q) of Schedule 2 deals expressly with arbitration clauses, referring to:   
 
 terms which have the object or effect of excluding or hindering the  
 consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy; 
 particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to 
 arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the  
 evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, 
 according to applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract. 
 
 
Trietel has suggested that the term ‘not covered by the legal provisions’ is meant to 
narrow the category of unfair arbitration clauses to those in which the parties have 
expressly agreed to exclude the powers of the courts to control the arbitrator’s 
decision.44  This interpretation cannot apply to domestic arbitrations, as the 
                                               
41
 S. 6(1) 
42
 J Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (per Denning LJ), although the Red Hand rule 
referred to the incorporation of exemption clauses.  
43
 s. 8(1) and (2). 
44
 Guenter Treitel, The Law of Contract, 10th ed  (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005) at 274 
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Arbitration Act disallows such agreements unless entered into during the arbitration 
proceedings.45  Others have argued that this term may refer to special statutory 
schemes in certain EU countries (Portugal and the Netherlands) that facilitate access 
to justice for consumers.46 In assessing item I(q) of the European Directive, which 
uses identical wording to the UTCCR, the German Court of Appeal ruled that 
consumer contract clauses that mandate arbitration and which are valid under national 
arbitration legislation are unobjectionable.47 This approach suggests that any 
arbitration clause that does not fall afoul of the UK Arbitration Act, will be lawful in 
the UK. The problem with this view is that it seems to render the UTCCR essentially 
redundant. 
Term I (q) also appears to be related to term (i) in the ‘indicative list’, which 
covers those clauses that bind the consumer to terms with which they had no real 
opportunity to become acquainted.  Therefore in order for an arbitration clause to be 
binding, it would be necessary to establish the degree of notice that the consumer was 
given with regards to that clause before the contract was signed, embracing 
considerations of both substantive and procedural ‘fairness’. The Red Hand rule again 
comes to mind. Or perhaps where consent was actually manifest, irrespective of the 
reasonableness of the notice, then the consumer should be bound by it.48   
Case law on arbitration clauses under the UTCCR suggest that the primary 
concern of the courts is that arbitration is prohibitively expensive and will result in 
                                               
45
 s. 69. 
46
 Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterese, Johnathan Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary (3rd ed, 
Blackwell, London, 2003) at 392. A third interpretation has been raised: these terms may refer to ad 
hoc arbitration schemes: Schiavetta, note 1 at 3. 
47
 Ref 6U 114/95, CLAB Europa Card no. DE000767, 23 May 1996 
<https://adns.cec.eu.int/CLAB/SilverStream/Pages/pgCardFrame.html> (last accessed December 
2006).  A similar decision was reached by the Tribunali de Roma under the EC Directive Annex I (q); 
CLAB Europa Card no. IT000725, 5 October 2000 
<https://adns.cec.eu.int/CLAB/SilverStream/Pages/pgCardFrame.html>  (last accessed December 
2006) 
48
 Schiavetta note 1 at 3. 
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many consumers abandoning legal claims against suppliers because the costs will 
outweigh the benefits. This worry appeared to occupy the court in Zealander & 
Zealander v Laing Homes,49 a case decided under the 1994 UTCCR, legislation that 
was substantially similar to the 1999 Regulations that replaced it.  The court held that 
the arbitration clause was inapplicable because the claimant consumer was faced with 
a significant imbalance under the UTCCR with respect to the defendant builder, in 
that the consumer would be required to instigate separate proceedings for the matters 
covered in the contract and some other matters falling outside of it, namely certain 
tortious claims and this would lead to ‘injustice through lack of resources’50. This 
amounted to unfair financial hardship to the consumer, who already had inferior 
resources relative to his opponent. While this decision has been applauded by some 
commentators for strengthening consumer protection51 it was arguably beyond the 
court’s purview in ruling on the validity of the contract to consider matters that were 
not encompassed by the contract – the additional claims in tort. Whether or not the 
fairness analysis should extend this far may depend on whether a court should 
examine the contract as a whole, as advocated by Lord Bingham in First National 
Bank52or the transaction as a whole, as advocated by Lord Millet in the same case.53 
The former approach must be preferable because otherwise the court will be 
effectively compelled to inquire into whether the consumer has obtained a good deal 
in the circumstances, which strays dangerously close to encompassing an evaluation 
of the ‘core terms’ which is prohibited under the UTCCR54. Perhaps more clearly 
flawed was the Zealander court’s apparent dismissal of the arbitration clause despite 
                                               
49
 (2000) 2 T.C.L.R. 724 (QB) [hereinafter Zealander] 
50
 At 3 (a). 
51
 Harris, Planterese, Tecks, note 46 at 393. 
52
 Note 35  at [17]  
53
 Ibid at [54] 
54
 Art 6(2).  Consumers are likely to be aware of the existence and significance of core terms. 
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the fact that it was not proved that the claimant’s bargaining position was weaker – it 
was merely not stronger, seemingly an over-zealous interpretation of unfairness.55 
 The approach courts have taken with respect to adjudication clauses may help 
illustrate the way in which Schedule 2 s. 1 (q) will be interpreted with respect to 
arbitration clauses.  In Picardi v Cuniberti56the court considered the effect of a 
provision in a contract for architectural services which required that the resolution of 
disputes be brought before an adjudicator specialized in handling disputes within that 
profession, rather than in the courts.  In concluding that the adjudication clause was 
unfair under the UTCCR, Toulmin J stated that ‘a procedure which the consumer is 
required to follow, and which would cause irrecoverable expenditure in either 
prosecuting or defending it, is something which may hinder the consumer’s right to 
take legal action…Costs in an adjudication can be very significant.  Unless it is 
properly explained to the consumer [this] …also may give the appearance of 
unfairness.’57 Toulmin felt that useful test for unfairness was to ask if the clause had 
been drawn to the attention of the consumer, would they obviously not have accepted 
it.58 The requirement of obviousness sets a high standard; only patently imbalanced 
arbitration clauses would be caught.  But the key point for Justice Toulmin appears to 
have been that under the terms of the contract, if there had been no agreement as to 
the appointment of a particular adjudicator, then the architects’ (the suppliers) 
professional body would appoint one on their own, implying that such an appointment 
would be self-interested and thus result in a higher probability of bias in favour of the 
                                               
55
 At 7(d), 5 (c) and 3 (a) noting that the Claimant’s had insurance to cover costs – up to an unspecified 
limit. 
56
 (2002) 94 ConLR 81 [hereinafter Picardi] 
57
 Ibid At [131] 
58
 Ibid at [129].  This view was echoed in Westminster Building Co Ltd v Beckingham 2004) 94 ConLR 
107 where the existence of independent advice regarding the presence and meaning of an adjudication 
clause was considered to be a relevant factor in the determination of its fairness. 
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appointing party, a tenuous inference on which to base a judgment.59 Furthermore, 
any allegation of bias in the arbitration would be properly the subject of judicial 
review.  
More helpful factors to be considered by the court when weighing the 
unfairness of an adjudication provision in a contract were suggested in by Judge 
Mosely in Lovell Projects v Legg60and included: 1. The adjudication does not provide 
for a final determination of the dispute, i.e. that additional costs would be incurred; 2. 
The sum awarded by the adjudicator is payable to the supplier who can hold it 
pending a final determination, giving him a cash flow advantage; 3. The costs of 
adjudication are not recoverable even if the consumer is ultimately proved right;61 4. 
The costs of the adjudication are considerable; and 5. The timescale of the 
adjudication is short and the consumer is less likely to have the resources to deal with 
the timetable than the supplier. Admittedly, any of these factors should rightly be 
viewed with suspicion by a court and this is because they all relate to a primary 
concern: the exploitation of a financially weaker party’s inability to pursue a legal 
remedy because of the potential expense associated with arbitration. This key 
component of unfairness in relation to adjudication clauses was re-iterated by the 
court in Byren & Langley v Boston,62 Observing that  ‘[compulsory consumer 
arbitration] provisions do effect a significant imbalance in the parties’ relationship by 
altering their modes of dispute resolution,’63 the court found an imbalance in the 
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burden of enormous costs associated with adjudication.64 It is noteworthy that such 
expense was not actually demonstrated by the Byren court.  Thus the risk alone of 
high costs in arbitration emerges as the primary concern in relation to any clause that 
removes the dispute from conventional litigation. 
   
C. Legal Aid and Cost Controls  
Given the above noted judicial preoccupation with arbitration costs, the extent to 
which public funding is available for arbitration must be evaluated in order to arrive 
upon a full understanding of imbalance between the parties and unfairness under the 
UTCCR. The Funding Code65 outlines the situations in which the Legal Services 
Commission of England and Wales (‘the Commission’) will provide legal aid for 
proceedings before arbitrators. The Commission will extend funding for arbitration 
disbursements, including, most importantly, payment of an arbitrator’s fees.66   
However, the fact that lawyer’s fees are not covered in arbitration could discourage 
impecunious consumers from advancing a claim through via arbitration. Conditional 
Fee Arrangements (‘CFA’)s, in which lawyers are paid only in the event of success, 
might address this problem and courts should be mindful of the ability of such 
arrangements to neutralize resource imbalances between parties.  The Access to 
Justice Act 1999 permitted CFAs for arbitration as part of an overall objective of 
reducing barriers to litigation.67  Miller has noted accordingly that CFAs will 
commonly be used in arbitration by claimants who are short on funds but who expect 
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to win their case.68 Furthermore, the Arbitration Act 1996 specifies that, unless parties 
agree otherwise, costs will follow the event, meaning that the losing party pays for the 
winner’s costs in arbitration, as well as its own69 which should comfort consumers 
with meritorious claims. The availability and cost of after the event litigation 
insurance to cover the opponent’s arbitration expenses in the event of failure should 
likewise be taken into account by the courts when assessing the impact of arbitration 
clause on the consumer’s right to access to justice.70 The mere incapacity of a 
consumer to finance a claim would not be sufficient justification for a court to strike 
out an exclusive arbitration clause. Rather it would need to be demonstrated that the 
consumer failed to obtain arbitration funding because of the arbitral procedure itself 
and that some form of funding could have been obtained had the action proceeded in 
the courts.  Otherwise the court would effectively be making a determination on the 
merits of the dispute rather than on the fairness of the process.   
There may be reason to expect that the Commission would be less likely to 
grant legal aid for a matter that would be heard before an arbitral tribunal than it 
would a similar matter before the courts. The Funding Code’s guidelines, which are 
used by the Commission in order to decide which applications for legal aid will 
receive funding, provide that one of the factors that will be considered is whether the 
matter is one of widespread public interest. This is taken to refer, inter alia, to claims 
that will potentially provide real benefits to a larger segment of society, not just the 
individual claimant,71 as well as matters which will establish a new legal precedent.72 
It is admittedly difficult to see how either of these considerations is applicable to 
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arbitration. First, as arbitration is essentially confidential, any notoriety that could 
potentially shame the losing company would be lost, such that future benefits in terms 
of consumer awareness would be minimal.73 Of course a supplier might have learnt its 
lesson from a lost arbitration and discontinue the behaviour that lead to the dispute in 
the first place and this represents a benefit to other consumers. Second, arbitration 
cannot result in a new legal precedent as arbitration does not operate under a system 
of precedent; there are generally no records of judgments and no duty upon arbitrators 
to rely upon past decisions. Arbitral awards may be appealed, ultimately generating a 
precedent or invoking the public interest. However, such considerations likely extend 
the scope of public interest too far when assessing the merit of a legal aid application. 
It should also be noted that a consumer party to an arbitration would need to fulfil the 
Funding Code’s eligibility requirements in order to receive legal aid, such as low 
personal income (which may be unlikely given the £5000 threshold) and high 
probability of success, but these obstacles would be faced equally by consumers who 
seek public assistance for claims in the courts. 
  The court’s legitimate concern that some arbitration procedures, particularly 
international ones, may be prohibitively expensive could be rectified by through the 
control of costs by the arbitral tribunal.  The Arbitration Act grants the arbitral 
tribunal the discretion not to award costs to the winner if the winner had conducted 
itself in a way that was unreasonable or oppressive – either in the hearing or in the 
transaction itself.74 The imposition of an exclusive arbitration clause resulting in a 
hearing the costs of which exceeded those which would have accrued at court could 
exemplify this type of behaviour, although it seems improbable that an arbitration 
tribunal would view the selection of itself as unreasonable. The tribunal could compel 
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the commercial party which had generated the standard form contract containing the 
arbitration clause (the implication of which may not have been fully understood by 
the consumer) to pay the consumer’s costs even if the commercial party was the victor 
on the merits.  Further cost protections are extended by the Arbitration Act.  A pre-
dispute agreement which requires that one party is to pay all or part of the costs of the 
arbitration regardless of the outcome is invalid.75  Arbitrators also have cost-capping 
powers, allowing them to limit the costs recoverable in respect of the arbitration, a 
provision that may also be readily invoked by losing defendants where the claimants 
have engaged in a CFA.76 These provisions, which recognize that consumers may also 
wish to invoke arbitration to assert their rights, have the effect of ‘creat[ing] a level 
playing field…and not deter[ing] a party from commencing arbitration proceedings’77 
because of the fear of excessive or improperly allocated expenses in the process.  The 
availability of Legal Aid and these cost controlling mechanisms tempers resource 
imbalances between consumers and suppliers that may be generated by the domestic 
arbitral process.  We will now turn our attention to the second main part of this article 
which concerns arbitration agreements in consumer contracts that have an 
international dimension.    
 
 III. INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER ARBITRATION   
A. Advantages and Disadvantages 
The popularity of the Internet has resulted in more consumers seeking goods and 
services abroad and likewise arbitration has begun to play an important role in the 
resolution of international disputes.  The rise in prominence of several leading 
commercial arbitral institutions such as the American Arbitration Association, the 
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International Chamber of Commerce and the London Court of International 
Arbitration International has contributed to the centralization of arbitral procedure and 
the legitimization of arbitral awards worldwide.78 The advantages of international 
arbitration in the commercial sphere have been observed by many commentators, 
notably Redfern and Hunter.79 Some of these can be applied to the consumer context.  
The most important benefit is the neutrality of the forum, which is assistive if the 
consumer is resident in a different jurisdiction from that of the supplier and fears that 
a foreign court will have a different understanding of justice than that of his home 
jurisdiction and this would unfairly prejudice his case. Reduced costs relative to 
litigation are another possible advantage. Gary Born urges that the expenses of 
international arbitration ‘will usually pale in comparison with the costs of legal 
representation if there are parallel or multiplicitous proceedings in the national 
courts,’ and that costs ‘will typically not approach those that are incurred if there is re-
litigation of factual issues in national and appellate courts.’80 This view is echoed by 
Redfern and Hunter who contend that the finality of arbitral awards is preferable to a 
court ruling which may simply be ‘the first step on a ladder of appeals.’81 The scope 
of appeal from international arbitrations is limited by the Arbitration Act 1996, which 
grants parties to a non-domestic arbitration agreement the absolute freedom to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the courts.82 Born adds that the flexibility of international 
arbitration, like its domestic counterpart, usually limits the potential for ‘costly, 
scorched-earth discovery and other procedural steps that may exist in some common 
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law jurisdictions.’83 National court proceedings in some jurisdictions are subject to 
equally significant delays and expense as are proceedings in the UK.84  
Confidentiality remains an advantage in international arbitration, which, as suggested 
above, could also be attractive to a wealthy consumer or public figure who wishes to 
shield the nature of their purchases from public scrutiny, although this is probably less 
secure with respect to international disputes because there is no clear duty of 
confidentiality for most international arbitral institutions. Awards can sometimes be 
made public if this is stipulated by government regulation.85  This could be equally 
attractive to a consumer who wants to benefit from the pressure placed upon a 
supplier by unfavourable media attention.  
Disadvantages of international arbitration have been observed as well, notably 
the potential for high costs.86 While arbitration appears to offer a less expensive 
resolution for more complex matters (for example, when assets are located in multiple 
jurisdictions), this advantage may be less pronounced in smaller, more straightforward 
claims. The limited powers of arbitrators, such as the lack of joinder, which is a useful 
mechanism in larger multi-party disputes, has similarly been cited with concern.87 
There may be reason to fear that international arbitration will be more biased against 
consumers than domestic arbitration.  Parties to international arbitration will usually 
be corporations or state entities rather than private individuals.  Consequently the 
local courts of the forum can afford to take a more lenient approach towards 
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arbitrations when called upon to intervene.  Indeed, international arbitration is 
expressly designed to limit the extent to which a national court may intervene.88 
When challenging the validity of an arbitration clause in an international 
contract (where one or more of the elements of the transaction takes place outside the 
UK) the English consumer must bring proceedings either in the court of his domicile 
(a UK court) or in the jurisdiction of the seat of arbitration prior to the arbitration 
taking place. A UK court, once that court has taken jurisdiction, will then consider the 
existence and material validity of the clause, which will first require the court to reach 
a conclusion as to which system of law it will use to answer those questions. Thus, in 
assessing the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an international consumer 
contract, unlike a domestic arbitration clause, the UK court will have to determine 
which law governs the analysis of that clause’s validity.  Arbitration clauses are 
excluded from the material scope of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations89 and consequently the construction of an arbitration clause 
will be governed by its proper law as ascertained by common law principles. The 
proper law of the arbitration clause will normally be the law applicable to the contract 
as a whole.  Therefore, if the contract contains an express choice of law, that chosen 
law will usually govern the arbitration clause.90 If the contract does not include an 
express choice of law, the law governing the contract (and the arbitration agreement 
within it) is normally inferred by the court from the seat of arbitration.91 While a 
discussion of courts’ interpretation of choice of law agreements is outside the scope of 
this article, it must be recognized that UK courts may be unwilling to use a system of 
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law with which to evaluate the validity of an arbitration clause in a consumer contract 
if it lead to an imbalance between the parties.  This is reflected in the Brussels 
Regulation,92 which does not directly apply to arbitration agreements93 but requires 
that in deciding upon choice of law, the courts cannot deprive consumers of the 
protections afforded to them by the mandatory rules of their country of their habitual 
residence.94 Article 16 of the Brussels Regulation provides that any claims brought 
against consumers must be brought in the country of the consumer’s domicile. Article 
17 permits departure from this requirement only by consent from the consumer after 
the dispute has arisen. Thus even in proceedings before foreign courts, an English 
consumer’s reliance upon the mandatory rules of his home jurisdiction will lead the 
court to consider the UTCCR.  Furthermore, section 89(3) of the Arbitration Act 
states that the UTCCR is applicable whatever the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement, as long as there is a ‘close connection’ between the contract and the 
European Economic Area (EEA).  Unfortunately, no definition of ‘close connection’ 
is provided in the Arbitration Act.  Some assistance may be found in the Rome 
Convention’s use of the term ‘close connection’, which involves one party being 
resident or having a main place of business in that country.95  Similarly, the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 requires that for there to be a close connection, the party 
was habitually resident in the UK at the time of entering into the contract, and the 
essential steps of making the contract were taken in the country of their habitual 
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residence.96 Thus UK consumers should be afforded the protection of the UTCCR 
regardless of the location of the supplier. 
 
B. Consumer Protection under the New York Convention 
The protections offered by the UTCCR are also engaged at the enforcement stage of 
the arbitral procedure through the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (also known as the New York Convention). 
The Convention, now ratified by more than 120 states, was designed to enhance the 
enforceability of international arbitration agreements and awards. Its virtual universal 
adoption throughout the industrialized world is widely considered as having 
contributed to the significant increase in the use of international commercial 
arbitration.97 The Convention requires national courts of signatory states to both 
recognize and enforce written agreements to resolve disputes via international 
arbitration98 with the exception that a national court may ignore an arbitration clause 
if it finds that the agreement is ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.’99The national court will make such determinations pursuant to its own 
rules, and for consumer contracts before UK courts this should now involve a 
consideration of the UTCCR. Moreover, although the New York Convention is 
associated with the enforcement of arbitral awards, it has been suggested that it 
contemplates the enforcement of arbitral agreements as well.100 Under Article V(1)a 
of the Convention, the enforcement of an award can be refused if the arbitral 
agreement is not valid under its applicable law as chosen by the parties, or if no law is 
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chosen, then the law of the country where the award was made.101  This has been 
interpreted also to mean the law of the country where the award will be made, which 
can be determined by the seat of arbitration before the arbitration has begun.102 The 
New York Convention offers several additional safeguards that protect weaker parties 
such as consumers, irrespective of where the arbitration is conducted.  The most 
important of which are these. First, national courts may refuse to enforce international 
arbitral awards where the parties were under some incapacity, or the agreement to 
arbitrate was not valid (under the law to which the parties subjected it, or if no law 
was chosen, under the law where the award was made).103 Second, enforcement may 
be denied if the party against whom the award was made was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case.104 This provision seems to contemplate, inter alia, the lack 
of legal aid which may affect a party’s ability to represent itself properly in an arbitral 
hearing.   
As we have seen, legal aid is available for some aspects of arbitration in the 
UK. There appears to be no obvious reason to expect that the same level of Legal Aid 
would not be available to a UK consumer with respect to a hearing before a tribunal 
located outside the UK. However, as the Funding Code weighs cost against 
probability of success, the potential for higher costs in an international arbitration 
(including travelling, accommodation, translations etc) might render Legal Aid 
assistance in such a matter unlikely, especially in uncertain claims.  This drawback is 
mitigated by the possibility of obtaining process funding through a CFA or a 
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contingency fee arrangement (in which the lawyer is paid a portion of the award), the 
latter of which is prohibited for most types of domestic hearings.105 There is no 
prohibition against contingency fees in relation to international arbitration hearings in 
which UK lawyers are involved, provided that such arrangements are not prohibited 
by the law of the forum.106 The availability of such arrangements might therefore 
result in greater access for legal representation in international consumer arbitrations, 
particularly large scale ones, where the prospect of a high fee will be enticing.  
Finally, domestic courts may refuse enforcement of the arbitral award under 
the New York Convention if it is contrary to the public policy of their country.107 It 
has been noted that public policy in this context has been taken to mean international 
public policy, which has been more narrowly construed than domestic public 
policy.108 Arbitral tribunals must consider the public policy of both the seat of 
arbitration and that of the state or states where enforcement is sought.  Still, the 
protections afforded by these exceptions should guide the courts of the UK towards a 
less restrictive interpretation of international commercial arbitration clauses in 
commercial contracts – any unfairness that has occurred in a consumer dispute may 
ultimately be caught at the enforcement stage rather than the initial evaluation of the 
contractual term. Of course, it may be preferable from a cost standpoint to prevent 
arbitration altogether from the outset by negating the arbitration clause rather than 
wait until an arbitral award has been rendered. 
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 Although courts have drawn a distinction between domestic and international 
arbitrability, suggesting that a court might not always apply its domestic law to 
questions arising from or relating to arbitration,109 the UTCCR itself does not 
distinguish between domestic and international arbitration for consumers. The OFT 
does urge that ‘it is not fair for the aggrieved consumer to be forced to travel long 
distances and use unfamiliar procedures’110 which hints that an arbitration clause in a 
contract concluded by an UK consumer in favour of an arbitral institution outside the 
UK would fall afoul of the fairness test. Travelling, accommodation and possibly 
translation expenses could raise the cost of international arbitration beyond that of a 
domestic one, exacerbating the fear that arbitration was being used strategically to 
suppress the legal rights of consumers. Simmonds suggests that a contractual term is 
likely to be viewed as even more unfair if, apart from geographical inconveniences, it 
seeks to impose on the consumer a system of law providing substantially less 
protection than that given in the European Union by the EC Directive.111  Thus the 
concern is not only between the process of arbitration versus courts, but fair 
applicable law versus unfair applicable law, a problem that is worsened by the fact 
that exclusive arbitration clauses in favour of specific institutions have been viewed 
by courts as indicative of choice of law.112 The protection of mandatory laws of the 
place of the consumer’s habitual residence should help mitigate any unfairness 
towards consumers engendered by foreign systems of law.   
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 It is possible that an English court could tale a more liberal view of a 
compulsory arbitration clause in an international consumer contract than a similar 
clause in a wholly domestic contract because of perceived sophistication on the part 
of consumers who choose to transact internationally and are therefore deserving of a 
lower level of protection.  This approach, which seems to have also found voice in the 
Arbitration Act’s £5000 minimum for matters taken to compulsory arbitration, has 
already been taken by courts in the EU. A French court upheld an arbitration clause 
governed by English law relating to the purchase of a car by a French consumer who 
was seen as less entitled to protection because he had engaged in a cross-border 
transaction.113 While this judicial attitude may have made more sense in the past when 
transacting internationally normally meant travelling internationally and conveyed a 
degree of savoir faire, the regularity of modern internet commerce has rendered 
international transactions the domain of all varieties of consumers.  This concept of 
comparative consumer sophistication will now be addressed in relation to advantages 
engendered by arbitration agreements.  
 
IV. HIDDEN FUNCTIONS OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THE ARBITRAL PROCESS 
The arguments in favour of a more lenient treatment of exclusive arbitration clauses 
extend beyond any practical cost advantages or confidentiality.  It has been suggested 
that standard form contracts containing terms such as arbitration clauses achieve 
economic efficiency because they reduce the proffering party’s transaction cost of 
negotiating with a large number of individual persons. This leads to an associated 
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increase in profits and ultimately a lower price to the client.114 For example, 
implementing standard form contracts may facilitate control of contractual relations 
made by subordinate members of staff who are relatively unskilled and work for 
lower pay rates. Risks inherent to a particular business may also be standardized, 
enabling delegation of contracting to those who have less training.115 The problem is 
that a more complex boilerplate contract may augment transaction costs born by the 
signing party as it may still be assiduously reviewed. This is an acceptable cost in a 
long term relationship, particularly if it is offset by a lower priced commodity, but not 
in a one-time consumer contract, especially if the consumer does not have the 
resources or the inclination to review a complex standard form contract to understand 
the implications of terms like an arbitration clause. The efficiency of standard form 
contracts has been further challenged because the inaccessibility of content results in 
consumers disregarding the boilerplate and shopping exclusively based upon price 
which leads them to lower cost, harsher term contracts which is inefficient because 
there are some customers who would select higher cost goods with better terms.116 
This reveals a flaw in economic theory generally, namely that all contractual parties 
are rational negotiators motivated by the desire to maximize their welfare which is 
expressed in their willingness to pay.117 It ignores considerations of altruism and 
integrity, and perhaps most notably customer loyalty. Customers may choose to pay 
more for a good if they feel they have developed a relationship of familiarity and trust 
with a supplier, and may well be attracted to less formal transactions based upon these 
bonds, such as those where a ‘handshake will do’. Statutory protections, like the 
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UTCCR, can be seen to correct such market imperfections by offering the consumer 
more choice – such as the choice to pursue dispute resolution in the courts. 
 Recent work by Gilo and Porat has theorized that standard form contracts are 
used for reasons other than simple economic efficiency and the conventionally 
understood exploitation by the supplier of informational asymmetry between the 
supplier and the consumer.118 Specifically, standard form contracts are especially 
useful in situations where the imbalance in information is not between the supplier 
and the consumer but between different kinds of consumers and between consumers 
and non-consumers, i.e. purchasers who are businesses. In such situations, a 
compulsory arbitration clause, and possibly also the transaction costs associated with 
reviewing one, can have beneficial repercussions for both parties.  First, suppliers 
could use standard form contracts, containing a term like an arbitration clause, to 
screen out unwanted clients.119 A supplier may view the willingness to engage in 
international arbitration as a proxy for client sophistication and might lead to contracts 
with other businesses (as desired) rather than consumers. Consumers might be viewed 
as less preferable because they purchase in lower quantity and with less regularity. 
Only clients who have read and understood the meaning of an arbitration clause and 
are willing to comply with it will enter into the transaction, and again these might 
likely be other businesses rather than consumers. Bulk discounts achieve a similar 
effect, as only non consumers tend to purchase in very large quantities. The customer-
selection function is based upon the premise that the undesirable unsophisticated 
clients will decline a contract that contains an arbitration clause, or any similar small-
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print terms they do not understand.120 Secondly, a supplier could use an arbitration 
clause to signal to sophisticated clients, either consumers or non-consumers, their 
level of expertise as a supplier, which is a way of defeating the supplier’s 
competitors.121 Thus an informed consumer, aware of the potential advantages of 
arbitration might interpret an arbitration clause as an indicative of the supplier’s 
capability relative to other suppliers. Business acumen associated with familiarity 
with arbitration could inspire confidence. Lastly, boilerplate terms such as arbitration 
clauses could function as a means of establishing customer preferences.122 If 
arbitration clauses are not rejected, suppliers could conclude that this is a contractual 
feature that consumers value, obviating the need for costly surveys. Thus suppliers 
can explore the viability of alternative means of dispute resolution by testing the 
term’s acceptability. These often hidden, non exploitative benefits of standard form 
contract terms like arbitration clauses should be kept in mind when they are reviewed 
by courts. 
As a final possible justification for a less restrictive view of arbitration 
clauses, courts should be mindful of the drive towards non-litigious resolution of 
disputes that has become endemic to our legal culture of extreme process-cost 
sensitivity.123 The goal of reducing the burden on the courts through alternative means 
of dispute resolution is also a high priority of the European Parliament, which has 
sought to promote the use of arbitration for consumer disputes.124 We have seen that 
arbitration often represents a less expensive alternative to court litigation, particularly 
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in the settlement of disputes that have an international element, but even where it is 
not less expensive the burden is still removed from the state, which is becoming 
increasingly ill-equipped to deal with the weight of disputes that are brought before it.  
Consequently courts should, when their discretion allows them to, curtail their 
eagerness to strike down arbitration clauses and respect parties’ demonstrated 
willingness to seek resolution through arbitration unless there is manifest cause not to, 
such as a patent lack of consent or understanding.  This should be reflected in a higher 
standard for ‘unfairness’ under the UTCCR and should also inform the definition of 
public policy under the New York Convention at the enforcement stage. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Consumer contracts that include clauses requiring compulsory dispute resolution via 
arbitration may raise concerns of oppression and consequently will be scrutinized 
under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and its ‘fairness’ 
test. Case law has shown that courts are willing to apply this test broadly and this may 
be unwarranted for several reasons. Costs can be lower in arbitration, particularly at 
the international level, largely due to the informality of the procedure and the limits 
on appeals. Legal Aid is available for some aspects of arbitration, and arbitrators have 
the power to control costs, both of which guard against the exploitation of consumers 
with inferior resources. International contracts involving UK consumers will be 
similarly subject to the ‘fairness’ analysis of the UTCCR and there are additional 
safeguards against oppression at the enforcement stage under the New York 
Convention. Some of the suspicion that courts have shown towards compulsory 
arbitration clauses in standard form contracts may be misplaced because such clauses 
serve other, legitimate business purposes that should not be hindered. Lastly, the 
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motivation to relieve the burden placed upon the court system in the UK should be 
reflected in an interpretation of arbitration clauses that is not hostile to non-court 
dispute resolution. Given these reasons it is hoped that in the future courts will adopt a 
more rigorous analysis of unfairness when examining arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
